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Abstract: 
In this article we study zoning in a circular and linear city model where firms are not 
allowed to locate in certain areas. A biased regulator is then introduced in a Bertrand spatial 
Competition framework. We prove that city zoning depends on the regulator bias towards 
consumers or firms. Both city models show a formal equivalence in the results: a consumer-
biased regulator pushes for strong competition whereas a firm-biased regulator induces weak 
competition. 
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1. INTRODUCCIÓN 
Life in the cities is full of externality effects caused by firms which are detrimental to 
the population. Public intervention can then become an internalization mechanism for firms that 
impose social costs on the rest of society. Authorities need to find regulating instruments which 
enable them to reduce any harmful external factors in the best possible way. Some of the 
possible tools to prevent negative externalities include tax related policies or urban planning. 
Authors like Mills (1989), Henderson (1991), Miceli (1992) and Wheaton (1993) have shown 
that zoning is a very popular urban planning policy. We analyse a regulation design in a 
duopolistic framework á la Hotelling under alternative political profiles.  
We consider a regulator in charge of the design of an urban city space divided in two 
different zones: an exclusively residential area where consumers live and a mixed area where 
consumers and firms locate. The aim of the regulator when restricting certain areas is to provide 
a high-quality environment, reduce trouble and prevent delinquencies. One of the advantages 
from this approach is that it can be analysed in terms of industrial policies1.    
In the context of regulation it is well known that authorities try to satisfy consumers and 
firms. Consequently, it is common to define a welfare function as a sum of consumer´s and 
producer´s surplus. However, in this paper, we introduce the social welfare function as a linear 
combination of firm´s profit and consumer´s utility2, in a similar way to Hamoudi and Risueño 
(2012). The interpretation for this welfare function is related to the political profile of the public 
authority. A “social” government or planner has more incentives to overvalue consumer surplus 
whereas a “liberal authority” values the surplus of firms more highly. In between the two types, 
a “centre or neutral oriented” government assigns similar weights to both firms and consumers. 
                                                 
1  The analogies between location and differentiation models are well-known: geographic space reflects characteristic 
space; consumer location expresses the preferred variety; location of firms is associated to firms´ offered product 
variety and transportation cost is taken as a disutility.  
 
 
2  Such weighted approach was defined by Baron and Myerson (1982) and used in welfare function formulation with 
several regulated models by Armstrong et al. (1994). 
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An important amount of studies on zoning regulation can be found in the spatial 
competition literature. This research focuses mainly on optimal firm location, regulated zone 
dimensions, pricing, land usage3 and social welfare effects.  In this regard, Lai y Tsai (2004) 
examine Hotelling´s linear city model with restrictions on the location of firms. They show that 
maximum differentiation holds under Bertrand competition and social welfare is improved.  
Tsai et al. (2006) analyse how zoning affects firm´s location and land rents. Chen and Lai 
(2008) investigate the effects of symmetric zoning in the linear city and prove that firms locate 
in equilibrium at the extremes of the zoning area under Cournot competition. They conclude 
that introducing a regulated zoning area can be welfare improving. Matsumura and Matsushima 
(2011) study a duopoly model with restrictions on the location of firms. Their objective is to 
analyse the effects on consumer’s welfare. The model shown is related to the issue of urban 
sprawl in order to determine the allowed dimension of economic activities. Lastly, Hamoudi and 
Risueño (2012) consider the effect of zoning regulation in duopolistic circular model with 
Bertrand competition where consumers and firms are situated in different city regions. They 
show that the optimal size of the shopping area depends on the regulator’s political profiles.  
The present research paper uses two standard spatial competition models: the circular 
and the linear city. Both models lead to similar results for Bertrand competition as in 
D’Aspremont et al (1979) and De Frutos et al.(1999) but different results for competition á la 
Cournot as in Hamilton et al. (1989), Anderson and Neven (1991) or Pal (1998)). Here, we 
intend to examine similarities and formal differences between both types of zoning models as 
well as highlighting the implications for urban and industrial policies. The results obtained for 
the circular and the linear case show that a firm-biased regulator favours dispersion in location 
and maximum differentiation in terms of the offered good. On the other hand, a consumer-
biased regulator produces opposite results: agglomeration and minimum differentiation.  
The rest of this article is organized as follows: part one analyses the circular model and 
part two the linear model. In both cases we describe the model first and then determine price 
                                                 
  3   See Fujita and Thisse´s model (1986).  
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and location equilibrium as well as optimal zoning policies. Each part concludes with the most 
relevant remarks on the effects of regulation on competition.  
 
2.  THE CIRCULAR MODEL 
2.1 THE MODEL. 
We study a location model in which a regulating authority plans the design of a city in a 
unitary length circular space. Any point in the circle corresponds to a number from the interval 
[0,1]. The southeasters’ point is 0 and we move anti clock wise from there. Points 0 and 1 will 
therefore coincide. The planner divides the circle in two regions: the first one is a commercial 
area bounded by points 
21
,vv such that 2/10
21
≤≤≤ vv where firms and families locate. The 
second one is the residential area where only families locate (see figure 1). There are two firms 
located at 
1
x and 
2
x  such that 
21
xx ≤ and ],[,
2121
vvxx ∈ selling the same good in the 
commercial area at prices 
1
p and 
2
p  respectively.  
 
   Figure 1: Circular Market   
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A continuum of consumers spread uniformly along the city. Each consumer buys one 
unit of good and pays the cost of transporting from the location of the firm from which it is 
bought to his/her own location. The transportation cost incurred by consumer is assumed to be a 
quadratic function of distance. Specifically, the function is taken as:     
    2,1,0),())(( 2 =>= ibxdbxdc
ii
,  
where the distance di(x) = │x – xi│ between   location consumer x and the location firm xi, is 
defined as the shortest distance on the circle between the two points  x, xi. 
Let s be the gross surplus for an arbitrary consumer, x. We assume s is large enough 
)0( >>s to allow all consumers to buy. Utility for consumer x from buying the good from firm i 
is, therefore, given as:  ))(()( xdcpsxu
iii
−−= .  A consumer purchases the product from 
firm i when   jiixuxu
ji
≠=< ,2,1),()( .        
The model is then formalized as a three-stage game. In the first stage, the regulator 
chooses the optimum size of the commercial area; in the second stage firms choose their 
locations simultaneously; in a third stage firms decide on their prices at the same time. The 
game is solved by backward induction. First, we discuss the equilibrium outcomes given the 
size of the commercial area. 
 
2.2    PRICE AND LOCATION EQUILIBRIUM  
The fact that the location space for firms is restricted does not affect in any way the 
location of the indifferent consumers4. Thus, the demand function expression remains the same 
as for the unrestricted space case (see de Frutos et al (1999)). We can then make the following 
change of variable: z = x2 – x1, where z represents the distance between both firms, that is, the 
difference between the chosen characteristics. The demand function is represented as follows: 
 
                                                 
4 An indifferent consumer, α  buys from firm 1 or 2 so that; )()( 21 αα uu = . 
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In addition, demand for firm 2 is:    D2 = 1 – D1 . 
Once consumer demands are found, the profit functions can be calculated using the 
following relation:  jisiendojiparappDpppB
jiiijii
≠=== 2,12,1),,(),(  
The existence of Nash equilibrium in prices is guaranteed for any size of the market v and any 
value of z, since profit functions are strictly concave (see De Frutos 1999).  The solution 
corresponds to: ).1()(
2
)(
1
zbzzNpzNp −== Consequently, demand and profit functions can be 
written as: 
  
)1(
2
1
)()(,
2
1
2121
zzbzBzBDD NNNN −====  
Proposition 1: 
There is a unique Nash location equilibrium for any commercial area given by: [v1 ,v2], 
2211
, vxvx NN ==  
 
Demonstration: (See Appendix). ■ 
 
The perfect equilibrium subgame expressions for prices, demand and profits are:
         
       12
,2,1),1(
2
1
)(,
2
1
),1()( vvvivbvvBDvbvvp N
i
N
i
N
i
−==−==−=
   
 
Remarks 
In the circular model under zoning regulation, the location pattern satisfies the 
maximum differentiation principle: 
2211
, vxvx NN == . Notice than if 2/1
12
=− vv , the 
location equilibrium remains the same as in the circular model without zoning (see De Frutos et 
al. (1999)). Therefore, zoning half of the circular market does not affect the location strategies 
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of firms. The intuition behind the maximum differentiation result is straightforward: firms 
locate at 
2211
, vxvx NN ==
 
in order to avoid competition and reap some spatial monopoly. 
The demands are equal and independent of the size v. Thus, zoning does not affect the 
structure of demand in the location equilibrium.  Prices and profits are also equal to each other 
and they are increasing to respect v.   
0)21(21 ≥−=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
vb
v
p
v
p
NN
,      





∈∀≥−=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
2
1
,00)21(
2
121 vforvb
v
B
v
B NN
. 
If the regulator chooses a large value for v, competition decreases. Therefore, if firms were able 
to decide on their location, they will always be interested in the commercial area to be as large 
as possible in which case,  2/1=v . On other hand, the regulator can force both firms to 
undergo more competition which could yield to zero profits for them. Indeed, if v tends to zero, 
prices and benefits will tend to zero, which mean that both firms engage in Bertrand 
competition. Subsequently, zZoning regulation can be seen as an industrial instrument to limit 
firms’ monopoly power. 
 Given that the location pattern in this zoning model still satisfies the maximum 
differentiation principle, the purpose of a regulator is to find the dimensions for the commercial 
area and the exclusively residential area.   
 
2.3 OPTIMAL ZONING 
Planners take their decisions according to the interests of firms and consumers and for 
this reason the objective function is usually defined as the sum of firm´s profit and consumer´s 
utility. Instead, at this point, we use an objective function for the regulator described as a linear 
combination from profits (firms) and utility (consumers). Consequently, we introduce the 
possibility to formally represent the regulator´s preferences in terms of the weight attached to 
profits or consumers. The welfare function can now be written as:  
   )()1()()( vUvBvW N λλ −+=  . 
Where: 
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• λ is the weight given by the regulator to firms. Thus, (1 – λ) accounts for the weight 
given to consumers. 
• )()()(
21
vBvBvB NNN +=  is firms’ profit.  
• 



+−= )()()( v
T
CvNBSvU , is the utility for all consumers.  
• S is consumer´s gross surplus.  
• )(vCT stands for total transport cost paid by consumers.  
Total transport cost is then formalized as: 
21
)( IIvC
T
+=
 
- I1 corresponds to total transport cost paid by consumers when they buy the good from seller 1.  
- I2 is the total transport cost paid by consumers when they buy the product from seller 2.   
     [ ] [ ] dxxxbdxxxbI
N
N
NN
21
10
2
11
2
1 )1()( ∫∫ +−+−= α
α
;            [ ]dxxxbI N
N
N
∫ −=
2
1
2
22
)(
α
α
,where NN
21
,αα  are indifferent consumers in terms of buying from firm 1 or firm 2.5 
We can then represent )(vCT  as follows: )133(12
)( 2 +−= vv
b
vC
T
.   
•  )(vC
T
 decreases as the size of v increases. The mixed location area for consumers-
firms is: [ ]2/1,0,0)12(
4
∈∀≤−=
∂
∂
vv
b
v
C
T . When the regulator´s objective is to 
minimize the total transport cost for consumers, 2/1=λ  in the objective function. The 
optimal size for this case is 2/1=v . 
Utility for the total of consumers is given by:  ( ) .199
12
)( 2 ++−−= vv
b
SvU   
• )(vU  is decreasing and reaches a maximum for v equal zero. In contrast to firms 
consumers are interested in a minimum size for the mixed consumers-firms area which 
then turns into a single point and 0=v . The price of the good is equal to zero for this 
                                                 
5  Indifferent consumers  .
2
1
2
,
2
21
2
21
1
+
+
=
+
=
vvvv
NN αα  
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value and transport cost reaches a maximum. Consumers pay a high price for transport 
cost but are compensated by a zero cost for the good. The intuition for this result is 
illustrated by the fact that consumers travel massively (ignore collateral costs) when a 
free good is offered.  
 
Given the expression for the welfare function W(v) the following can be highlighted:  
 - When λ >1/2, the regulator weights the interest of firms more than consumer´s. In this case we 
define the planner as conservative. 
 
- However, when λ <1/2, the opposite happens and we define the biased regulator as liberal.  
 
- When λ =1/2, we have a neutral case in which the same weight is given to both groups: 
consumers and firms. Furthermore, the welfare function for this case is depicted as:    
    )]([2/1)( vCSvW
T
−=  
The social welfare W(v) is defined as the sum of the firms’ profit and the utility for all 
consumers. 
 
We now focus on the study of the welfare function when equilibrium in prices and 
location is taken into account. The optimal strategy for the regulator is given by:  
           
    )2/1(0..
),(
≤≤
=
vts
vWMaxArgv
v
O
                     
  
 By substituting the expression for )()( vCyvB
T
N  in the objective function we obtain the 
following: 





+−−−+−−= )133(
12
)1()1()12()( 2 vv
b
SvbvvW λλ  
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Proposition 2:  
For 
2
1
0 ≤≤ v , the optimal size for the mixed firms-consumers area is given as:  
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Demonstration :(See appendix)■ 
 
Remarks: 
Note that according to the bias of the regulator, it pushes for one or another type of zoning or 
other. Zoning, thus, changes the distribution of firms, in effect: 
- If 
7
3
0 ≤≤ λ ,  the regulator is consumer-biased. Agglomeration is then obtained, that is, 
the location space for firms is reduced to a single point, 0
1
=
∗
c
v .  In this case, 
competition among firms is maximum (Bertrand type) which implies the price of all 
products is close to zero. These factors clearly benefit consumers as they can live in a 
larger area enjoying more welfare.  On the other hand, in terms of industrial policy, the 
regulator allows only one characteristic of the good to be produced despite the 
possibility to produce two characteristics. In this case, we obtain the following results:  
i) utility for the total of consumers is:        ,12/)0( bSU −=  
 ii) the profit function of firms equals:       ,0)0( =B   
iii) the welfare function can be expressed as:     )12/()1()0( bSW −−= λ  . 
 
- If 7/3=λ , social welfare remains constant and independent from the size of the 
commercial area. The regulator has no a priori preference on the dimension of the 
commercial area.  
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- When 1
7
3 ≤≤ λ , the regulator favours firms because the value of v,  
2
1*
3 =cv   is their 
preferred result. In this case we have dispersion, since firms locate in the end points of 
the interval. 
2
1
,0
21
== xx . This involves a clear support for a product variety 
industrial policy. In this case: 
 i) the utility for the total of consumers: ,48/13)2/1( bSU −=  
ii) the profit of firms is:               ,4/)2/1( bB =   
 iii) the welfare function is:                    )1325()48/()1()2/1( −+−= λλ bSW  . 
We can observe that a firm biased regulator, ),17/3( ≤≤ λ  diminishes the total utility 
for consumers and improves profit for firms )0()2/1( UU < , . 
  Now, we can represent these results in figure 3 by drawing the optimum size for the 
commercial area: 
 
  Figure 2 : Optimum size for the commercial area.  
 
The horizontal axis shows the value of parameter λ whereas the vertical axis shows the 
value of parameter v. The thick line refers to the optimum size of the commercial area.  
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3. THE LINEAR CITY MODEL.  
3.1 THE MODEL 
Similarly to the circular case, we introduce a regulator which constraints the production 
area to the segment (v1, v2). Inside this interval the location of firms is given by (x1, x2), so that 
0≤v1 ≤ x1≤ x2≤ v2≤1. 6 Consumers also distribute uniformly among the linear city of length one 
[0,1] where the areas [0, v1) y (v2, 1] are only residential. Again, this model is formalised as a 
three stage game. In the first stage, a regulator chooses the size of the commercial area. In the 
second and third stages firms simultaneously decide on locations and prices.   
We can represent the model as follows: 
 
    Figure 3: Linear Market 
  
Using a quadratic function as transport cost defined as: 
   2,1,0),())(( 2 =>= ibxdbxdc
ii
, 
 where the distance di(x) = │x – xi│ between the  location for consumer  x and the location of 
firm xi. 
   The consumer indifferent is:   
2
)(
)(2
12
12
12
xx
xxb
pp +
+
−
−
=α .
 
                                                 
6 Lai y Tsai (2004) have metioned this type of zoning in their article withouth analysing it. They have studied the 
linear city model in [0, 1] and assumed the area [0, z) to be only residential.  
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Given the uniform distribution of consumers along the linear city, the results 
obtained for the regulated model are the same as in D’Aspremont et al. (1979) except 
for the location equilibrium which is given by: 
2211
; vxvx NN ==  . In this context, we can 
deduce the following results: 
                       )4)((
3
1
)(),2)((
3
1
)(
2112221121
vvvvbvpvvvvbvp NN −−−=++−=  
                                       
6
)(
3
1
)( 12
vv
vN
+
+=α  
 ,)2()(
18
),( 2
1212211
vvvv
b
ppB ++−= ,)4()(
18
),( 2
1212212
vvvv
b
ppB −−−=  
In order to compare profits between the firms, we compute )()(
21
vBvB nN − and we obtain: 
  10))(1()(
3
2
),(),(
211212211211
≤+≥+−−=− vvifvvvvbppBppB  
Given the equilibrium locations: 
2211
; vxvx NN ==  , the firm closer to the center of the 
commercial area obtains higher profits. Under symmetric zoning, 1
21
=+ vv  firms obtain the 
same profit. The regulator has no a priori preferences for any of the firms since both are private 
profit maximizing entities. In turn, we focused on the study of optimal zoning for the 
commercial area in the symmetric zoning case where: 1
21
=+ vv . 
 
3.2 OPTIMAL ZONING. 
 We proceed to solve the last stage of the game given prices and locations in 
equilibrium. We determine the optimal size of the commercial area by restricting the study to 
the symmetric case in which v1 + v2 = 1, where v2 – v1 =  v.  
  Equilibrium locations under this condition are also symmetric to the extremes of the 
market. The above obtained results can then be expressed as:      
 
,
2
1
,
22
1
,
22
1
21
=+=−= NNN
v
x
v
x α ,)()(
11
bvvpvp NN ==  .
2
1
)()(
21
bvvBvB NN ==    
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Prices and profit, thus are increasingly dependent to v. Firms ideally prefer the maximum size 
for the commercial, v=1. 
         
 As in the circular case, the objective function for the regulator is given as: 
    [ ])()()1()()( vCvBSvBvW
T
NN
−−−+= λλ  
In this function λ ,
 
)(vB N , S, )(vC
T
, are respectively the weight given to firms by the 
regulator; the total profit, consumers´ total surplus, and total transportation cost which is:  
   
[ ] [ ]
12/)133(
,2/2/12/2/1)(
2
21
2
0
+−=
−−++−= ∫∫
vvb
dxvxbdxvxbvC N
N
T α
α
 
Observe that transportation cost coincides with the expression for the circular city. Nevertheless, 
in this case ]1,0[∈v , which for
 
)(vC
T
 implies that: 
 
- is decreasing for [ ] ,2/1,0∈∀ v  is increasing [ ],1,2/1∈∀ v and reaches its minimum value for
2/1=v , which will oblige firms to locate in the following points: 4/3,4/1
21
==
NN xx , for 
which 48/1)2/1( =
T
C  .  This is an identical result to the optimal social value stemming from 
the unrestricted linear city model.  
 
- On the other hand, the total price [ ] ( ) 12/193)()( 2 ++=+ vvbvCvB
T
N
 
paid by consumers 
reaches a minimum for v equal zero:
 
[ ] [ ].1,004/)32(/)()( ∈∀≥+=∂+∂ vforvbvvCvB
T
N   
 
 Due to the above argument, oppositely to firms consumers are interested in the size of 
the commercial area being reduced to a single point, 0=v , which involves firms locating at 
exactly the same point:  .2/1
21
==
NN xx The price of the good is equal to zero for this value and 
transport cost reaches a maximum. Therefore, it is worth for consumers to pay a high total 
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transport cost since that will mean a zero price ,0)0()0(
11
==
NN pp for the good as in the circular 
case.  
Given the expressions of )()( vCyvB
T
N , the regulator´s objective function is written 
as: ).133()1(
12
)12()( 2 −+−−+−= vvS
b
bvvW λλ       
 
Proposition 7:  
 For 10 ≤≤ v , the optimal size of for the mixed consumers-firms area is given by:  
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Demonstration :(See appendix)■ 
 
Remarks. 
- If the regulator is consumer-biased  )42,07/3( ≈≤λ  and the commercial area is 
restricted to ,0
21
=−=
∗∗∗
LLL
vvv  the end points of the restricted interval coincide with
2/1
21
==
∗∗
LL
vv . Firms locate then in the same point, 2/1
2121
====
∗∗
LL
NN vvxx . They 
engage in competition “à la Bertrand”, with null prices ( 0)()(
21
== vpvp NN  ). We then 
have agglomeration in urban policy terms and minimum differentiation in product 
variety (industrial policy). We can then calculate )0(U , )0(B and )0(W :  
i) utility for the total of consumers is:        ,12/)0( bSU −=  
 ii) the profit function of firms equals:       ,0)0( =B   
iii) the welfare function can be expressed as:     )12/()1()0( bSW −−= λ  
  
16 
 
If the regulator´s bias (λ) takes some value between 3/7 and 5/9; the optimal size  ∗
L
v  
reaches a minimum in the lower end of the interval for ,7/3=λ and a maximum in the 
upper end for ,9/5=λ i.e for 0)7/3(* =
L
v ,  1)9/5(* =
L
v . In this case 10 * ≤≤
L
v  is 
increasing so that when λ  is higher the value of v grows. We then move from 
agglomeration to dispersion (from minimum differentiation to maximum 
differentiation).  When the social planner assigns a value of ,2/1=λ  the optimal size of 
the commercial area is reached for 2/1* =
L
v . In this case, )0(U , )0(B and )0(W are 
given by: 
i) utility for the consumers is: ,)234625(
)1(48
)
)1(2
37
( 2
2
−+
−
−=
−
− λλλλ
λ b
SU  
ii) profit function of firms is :   
)1(2
37
)
)1(2
37
( λ
λ
λ
λ
−
−
=
−
−
bB   
iii) welfare function is:     )23118143(
)1(48
)1()
)1(2
7
( 2 +−
−
−−=
−
− λλλλλ
λ b
SW  . 
 
- Finally, if the regulator is firms-biased, 55,09/5 ≈≥λ , then ,1=∗
L
v  or identically, 
1,0
2211
====
∗∗
L
N
L
N vxvx . The mixed consumers-firms area corresponds to the 
interval [ ]1,0 ; firms can locate in the whole market and they choose maximum 
differentiation in terms of product variety. This corresponds to agglomeration when 
interpreted in terms of location patterns.  Now,  )0(U , )0(B and )0(W correspond to:  
 i) the utility for the total of consumers: ,12/13)1( bSU −=  
ii) profit of firms is:                         ,)1( bB =   
 iii) welfare function is:                        )1325()12/()1()1( −+−= λλ bSW  . 
Similar to the circular model when the regulator is firms-biased meaning that, 
),17/3( ≤≤ λ  the total utility for consumers decreases and )0()2/1( UU < , firms 
profits improve, )0()2/1( BB >  . 
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We can easily represent these analytical results in the following figure:  
 
Figure 4: Linear Model. 
 
Notably, the results for the optimal size of the mixed commercial-residential are the same for 
the linear and the circular model.   
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this article we analyse spatial competition in a regulated market in which consumers 
locate freely along the market space, whereas firms are obliged to locate in a restricted area. 
First, we study the influence of regulation on competition in a circular space and the same 
question is then analysed for the circular space. The contribution from the present article is the 
analysis of a regulator with different biases (weights in the objective function). Under these 
premises we obtain agglomeration or dispersion results which can be interpreted in terms of 
urban policies. Moreover, these results can also be scrutinized from an industrial policy 
perspective as minimum or maximum differentiation cases. On the other hand, the question of 
the influence from the regulators´ bias on competition is also investigated. In this respect it can 
be stated that strong competition is triggered in the consumer-biased regulator case whereas 
18 
 
weak competition arises in the case of a firms-biased regulator. For a neutral regulator we find 
moderate competition. Lastly, we find no relevant differences between the results for the 
circular zoned market and the linear one.  
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      APPENDIX. 
 
Demonstration of Proposition 1: 
Given the expressions for the price equilibrium profit functions; the Nash equilibrium 
locations can be calculated by using the first order condition: ,0,0
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Demonstration of Proposition 2: 
For clarity reasons,  the welfare function is rewritten as follows:  
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By using the first order condition we find that: )37)(21(
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.  Considering 
that this condition depends on the value of parameter λ, in order to determine the maximum a 
second order condition is needed: 2
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, we can deduct the following results: 
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If λ   the social welfare function is concave and reaches a 
maximum for 
2
1
3
==
∗
c
vv  
0
7
3
2
2
=
∂
∂
⇒=−
v
W
If λ   the social welfare is constant which means it takes the 
same value for any value of v between 0 y ½. This means the maximum is reached for ∗=
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so that .
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If λ  , in this case the social welfare function is convex and the 
solution for the first order condition corresponds to a minimum, so that a maximum is obtained 
for 0
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Demonstration of Proposition 3: 
By using the first order condition, [ ] 0))1(2)37(
4
=−−−=
∂
∂ λλ vb
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W
 and for  1≠λ , 
it is found that 
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